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Comment
Aligning Online Privacy Protection with
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: How Joffe
Can Be Used to Modernize the Wiretap Act
Matthew Mason*
Between May 2007 and 2010, as part of its popular Street
View project, Google collected an enormous amount of Wi-Fi
data transmitted from unencrypted networks throughout the
United States and over thirty countries worldwide.1 After
initially denying the collection of any payload data,2 Google
publicly acknowledged that fragmented samples of payload
data were collected from open Wi-Fi networks due to a code
mistakenly included in its Street View software.3 Several
months later, however, Google admitted that the data collected
was not just fragmentary in nature;4 in some instances the full
content of e-mails, URL searches, passwords, and financial
transactions were collected.5 In response to what has been
© 2014 Matthew Mason
* JD Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank the entire staff of MJLST for their hard work throughout
the year, and, in particular, thanks to the MJLST editors and staff who did a
tremendous job revising and editing this Comment. The author also thanks
Professor William McGeveran for providing guidance and feedback throughout
the process.
1. Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd. 4012, 4012 (Apr. 13, 2013) (notice of
apparent liability) [hereinafter FCC Notice]; see In re Google Inc. Street View
Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
2. In re Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (describing how Google claimed,
on April 27, 2010, that only SSIDs and MAC addresses were collected).
3. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4012 (providing that Google
acknowledged the collection of fragmented payload data on May 14, 2010).
“[I]t’s now clear that we have been mistakenly collecting samples of payload
data . . . even though we never used that data in any Google products.” Id. at
4015 (quoting Alan Eustace, WiFi Data Collection: An Update, GOOGLE
OFFICIAL BLOG, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collectionupdate.html (last updated June 9, 2010)).
4. Id. at 4012–13 (explaining how Google admitted for the first time that
non-fragmented payload data was indeed captured).
5. Id.
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called
a
“big
brother-like . . . invasion
of
privacy,”6
investigations have been launched in the United States7 and
abroad.8
In a private action against Google, the Northern District of
California denied Google’s motion to dismiss a claim alleging
that Google’s collection of payload data from unencrypted Wi-Fi
networks violated the Wiretap Act.9 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Wi-Fi communications do not constitute
an “electronic communication . . . readily accessible to the
general public” under the Wiretap Act, and thus are not exempt
from liability.10
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Joffe v. Google, Inc. raises a
number of important issues that may have significant
implications on privacy protections for Internet and other
electronic communication. Joffe exposed our current privacy
protection framework as inadequate for new technologies and
advancements in communication. Such inadequacy raises the
question as to what extent, and in what way, Congress must
update the Wiretap Act to accommodate a changing
communication landscape since the enactment of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986.11 Furthermore, it
becomes necessary to consider whether users of unsecured

6. Cecilia Kang, Growing Anger over Google Street View Privacy Breach,
POST TECH. (May 20, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
posttech/2010/05/the_anger_is_growing_over.html (quoting Washington D.C.
Council Member Jim Graham).
7. Juliana Gruenwald, FTC Drops Probe of Google Wi-Fi Snooping,
NAT’L J., http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/ftc-drops-probe-of-google-wi-fisnooping-20101027 (last updated Oct. 27, 2010, 3:42 PM); Kristena Hansen,
37 States Join Probe into Google Wi-Fi Data Collection, L.A. TIMES (July 21,
2010, 1:46 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/07/googlestreet-view.html; Amy Schatz & Amir Efrati, FCC Investigating Google Data
Collection, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2010, 2:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052748704804504575606831614327598.
8. See FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4019, 4023–24 (citing Canadian,
French, and Dutch investigations which all concluded that Google’s collection
of payload data violated applicable data protection or online privacy laws).
9. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197,
213–14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012)).
10. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012)).
11. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L.
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
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Wi-Fi networks have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their transmitted electronic communications. As a corollary, it
is important to examine how offline Fourth Amendment
principles may be applied to an increasingly online society to
protect an individual’s electronic and Internet communications.
This Comment seeks to examine how Congress, and the
courts, might use Joffe as a springboard to bring privacy
protections up to date with technological and communication
advances. Part I will summarize how Wi-Fi communication
works and the accompanying threats to privacy, examine the
current statutes that protect against the interception of
communications, summarize the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) investigation of the Street View incident, and assess the
current protection for online communication under the Wiretap
Act as well as basic principles of privacy law. Part II will
comment on the reasoning and holding advanced by the Joffe
court, and place Joffe in context with the current state of the
law as described in Part I. Finally, Part III will argue that
Congress and courts should use Joffe to align the reality of
users’ knowledge of Wi-Fi technology and reasonable
expectations of privacy with the Wiretap Act. This Comment
concludes that Congress should amend the ECPA to expressly
protect both encrypted and unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions,
and that courts should adapt offline Fourth Amendment
principles
to
protect
online
and
other
electronic
communications.
I. UNDERSTANDING CURRENT WI-FI TECHNOLOGY,
ON- AND OFFLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION, AND THE FCC
GOOGLE INVESTIGATION
A. WI-FI TECHNOLOGY, PACKET SNIFFING, AND LOCATION DATA
Wi-Fi constitutes any kind of wireless local area network
that uses radio waves to connect laptops and other devices to
the Internet.12 Wi-Fi networks operate on Industrial, Scientific,

12. Brief of Appellant Google Inc. at 3, Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262
(9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]; Mani Potnuru,
Note, Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act’s Ability to Protect Against Wi-Fi
Sniffing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 89, 93 (2012).
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and Medial (ISM) radio bands.13 Wireless networks use
different ISM band frequency ranges, with each range further
divided into channels.14 Wi-Fi enables point-to-point
communication between specific devices, sent directly from one
device to another.15 A wireless access point (WAP) connects to a
user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) through a wired
connection and communicates over radio frequencies to devices
equipped with a Wi-Fi adapter.16 The WAP only allows
authenticated devices to associate with, and use, the Wi-Fi
network.17
To facilitate communication with other devices, the WAP
transmits a signal providing basic information about the Wi-Fi
network.18 The transmitted information includes a device’s
medium access control (MAC) address,19 and service set
identifier (SSID).20 A device’s MAC address and SSID are
unencrypted,21 and can be automatically detected by most
computers and smartphones.22 Devices capable of Wi-Fi
connectivity use the MAC address and SSID to connect with a
WAP and communicate over the Internet.23

13. See Potnuru, supra note 12, at 93 (providing that ISM bands are
unregulated frequencies which are part of the radio spectrum that may be
used by anyone).
14. See id. at 93–94 (explaining that each wireless network is “configured
to operate on one of these channels”).
15. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
in Support of Appellees and Urging Affirmance at 9, Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729
F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter EPIC Brief].
16. See Potnuru, supra note 12, at 93 (comparing a WAP to a short-range
cell tower, and Wi-Fi adapters to radio receivers).
17. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 22. Authenticated devices are able to
connect to the Internet and each other through the WAP. FCC Notice, supra
note 1, at 4014–15.
18. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4014–15; Brief of Appellant, supra note
12, at 4.
19. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015. A MAC address is a numeric
identifier for each WAP. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4.
20. An SSID identifies the particular wireless local area network (LAN).
FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015.
21. Id. (explaining that a device’s MAC address and SSID are considered
non-content data).
22. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4.
23. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015.
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Wi-Fi networks are either encrypted or unencrypted.24
Network owners commonly forgo encryption for a variety of
reasons,25 such as to foster public access to information,26 lack
of technological expertise,27 and the fact that users must
affirmatively enable mechanisms to ensure encryption.28
Additionally, technological limitations make it difficult to
create a secured, encrypted network within a public hotspot.29
Regardless of encryption, Wi-Fi communications are coded and
sent only to specific destinations.30 The transmitted data
becomes encapsulated into frames, which are then fragmented
and sent over the Wi-Fi network.31 Wi-Fi signals travel short
distances, usually only enough to cover one’s home.32
Despite the coded nature of Wi-Fi transmissions, packet
sniffing presents a significant privacy threat to electronic
communications sent over a wireless network. In essence,
packet sniffers are a type of wiretap applied to Wi-Fi networks
in order to monitor, intercept, and read data of transmitted
electronic communications.33 Packet sniffers have the ability to
collect and read e-mails, web searches, passwords, financial

24. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. Encryption permits a user to
ensure that communication made over the network remains private. Potnuru,
supra note 12, at 94 (citing password protection as an example of encryption,
making interception very difficult, if not nearly impossible).
25. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5.
26. Id.; Bruce Schneier, Steal This Wi-Fi, WIRED (Jan. 10, 2008),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/01/s
ecuritymatters_0110.
27. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 94–95.
28. Id. at 94 (explaining that the factory default settings of most routers
and WAPs are set to operate in open mode).
29. Id. at 95, 107; see also EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 29 (concluding
that no practical solutions currently exist to address this problem).
30. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1278 (9th Cir. 2013); see EPIC
Brief, supra note 15, at 12, 23 (stating that a device must be authenticated to
send and receive communication over a Wi-Fi network).
31. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 23–24.
32. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Benjamin Joffe, et al. at 16, Joffe v.
Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter Brief
for Plaintiffs-Appellees]. Wi-Fi devices tend to have a range of 70 feet through
300 feet, whereas an AM radio broadcast can cover up to 100 miles. EPIC
Brief, supra note 15, at 17.
33. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 32; Packet Sniffing, INTERNET SECURITY
SYS., http://www.iss.net/security_center/advice/Underground/Hacking/
Methods/Technical/Packet_sniffing/default.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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transactions, and even credit card numbers.34 With the use of
advanced technology, packet sniffers can capture, decode, and
re-package fragmented Wi-Fi communications.35
Furthermore, the increasingly popular use of geolocation
technology to gather location data raises another concern.36
Currently, MAC address mapping is the most commonly used
method to gather location data, and involves a location provider
(such as a Street View car) using a GPS device to detect MAC
addresses of individually owned routers.37 The GPS device then
measures a router’s signal strength and GPS coordinates.38
MAC addresses for visible wireless routers are then submitted
to a database, which returns the individual user’s location.39
Smartphones regularly transmit the name, location, and signal
strength of nearby networks to a company like Apple or Google,
enabling the phone company to pinpoint a user’s location.40
Additionally, many popular apps use and occasionally share
location data absent the user’s knowledge or consent.41 A huge
market for location-based services exists that is unlikely to
disappear anytime soon.42
34. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 32. Packet sniffers are becoming
increasingly easy to install on routers, which is troublesome because the
presence of sniffers are often very difficult to detect. Packet Sniffing, supra
note 33. Programs such as Firesheep are available for free online and make it
easy to see what other users on an unsecured network are doing. Kate
Murphy, New Hacking Tools Pose Bigger Threats to Wi-Fi Users, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/technology/personaltech/
17basics.html. However, the technical expertise required to use packet
sniffing programs is relatively uncommon. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 110–11.
35. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 24, 30–32 (explaining that sniffing
programs tend to require sophisticated software and hardware to implement).
36. Gathering of location data with geolocation technology started with
Skyhook’s “wardriving” program in 2003. See Julia Angwin & Jennifer
Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect User Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870398370457627
7101723453610.
37. Raymond Chow, Note, Why-Spy? An Analysis of Privacy and
Geolocation in the Wake of the 2010 Google “Wi-Spy” Controversy, 39 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 56, 61 (2013).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 61–62.
40. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36.
41. Id.
42. See id. (stating that in 2010 a $2.9 billion market existed for locationbased services, with an expected increase to $8.3 billion by 2014).
Furthermore, location-based features are some of the most popular features
online. Peter Fleischer, Greater Choice for Wireless Access Point Owners,
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B. STATUTORY PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR COMMUNICATIONS
Statutory protections against the interception of
communications are relatively recent developments in the
United States. In 1968, Congress passed Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap
Act) to create a private action for the interception of
communications.43 The Wiretap Act, however, expressly limited
protection to the “unauthorized aural interception” of wire or
oral communications.44
In order to update and clarify federal privacy protections to
align with changes in communication technology, Congress
passed the ECPA in 1986.45 In doing so, Congress sought to
protect an individual’s privacy rights in computer-to-computer
transmissions of data and e-mail.46 Another goal of Congress
was to protect radio hobbyists from liability for innocently
scanning frequencies of traditional radio broadcasts in order to
reach public communications.47
A number of ECPA subsections were particularly relevant
in Joffe. Subsection 2511(1) assigns liability to “any person
GOOGLE
OFFICIAL
BLOG
(Nov.
14,
2011,
2:00
AM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/greater-choice-for-wireless-access.html.
43. Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012)). The Department of Justice notes that
the Wiretap Act generally bars third parties from installing packet sniffers
capable of reading Internet traffic. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV.,
COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, SEARCHING AND
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 167 (2009).
44. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
45. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848; S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (“[T]he law must advance with
the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment.
Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will
gradually erode as technology advances.”); see H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 16–19,
31 (1986) (expressing worry about the gradual erosion of privacy rights and
attempting, through the passage of the ECPA, to keep privacy protection of
electronic communication consistent with Fourth Amendment expectations of
privacy); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating
that the objective of the ECPA was to protect against the interception of
electronic communication).
46. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, 5 (suggesting that e-mail should receive
similar privacy protections as regular mail); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at
22 (stating that individuals likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their e-mail communications).
47. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4.
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who: (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept . . . any
wire, oral, or electronic communication.”48 Importantly, two
exceptions from Wiretap Act liability are provided by
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) and (g)(ii).49 Subsection 2510(12) defines
electronic communication as “any transfer of . . . data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by
wire, [or] radio.”50 Subsection 2510(16) defines “‘readily
accessible to the general public’ . . . with respect to a radio
communication” as any communication that is not included in
the five explicit exceptions provided by the statute.51
In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which, under § 2510(16),
added a new exception to the presumption of accessibility
pertaining to electronic communications.52 The amendment
sought to extend ECPA protection to new forms of wireless data
communication.53 Despite Congress’ good intentions, the
§ 2510(16) amendment led a rather short life.
Congress amended the ECPA once again through the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).54 While primarily focused on habeas corpus reform
and anti-terrorism efforts, the AEDPA removed the § 2510(16)
explicit exception to the presumption of accessibility for
electronic communications added by the CALEA two years
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012).
49. It is not unlawful for any person: “(i) to intercept . . . an electronic
communication made through an electronic communication system that is
configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). Additionally, it is not unlawful for
any person: “(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is
transmitted . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) (providing four explicit
circumstances where it is lawful to intercept radio communication).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16); see In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079–80 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that § 2510(16)
raises a presumption of accessibility and enumerates five specific exceptions
for what is not considered readily accessible).
52. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub.
L. No. 103-414, § 203, 108 Stat. 4279, 4291 (1994) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2510(16)).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 14 (1994) (recommending the
extension of ECPA protection to cover new forms of wireless data
communication); see also S. REP. No. 103-402, at 32 (1994) (discussing the
rationale for the ECPA amendment).
54. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303.
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prior.55 Legislative history suggests Congress believed
electronic communications were adequately protected prior to
the passage of the CALEA; the CALEA amendment only
intended to make it abundantly clear that electronic
communications were protected under the ECPA.56 Aside from
the protection provided by the ECPA, CALEA, and AEDPA,
federal privacy law remains relatively unchanged since the
passage of the Wiretap Act over forty years ago.57
C. FTC AND FCC GOOGLE INVESTIGATIONS
The FTC became the first U.S. agency to conduct an
investigation, albeit short lived, addressing Google’s collection
of payload data.58 The FTC informed Google that it would be
dropping its investigation just days after Google publicly
admitted it had collected non-fragmented payload data.59 David
Vladeck, then-director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection (a
division of the FTC), dropped the investigation on account of
the actions Google took in the wake of the Street View
incident.60 For example, Google implemented a new “opt-out”
policy through which a user may change their SSID to end with
the designation “_nomap” to prevent data from being
collected.61 Encouragingly, the FTC has since called on

55. Id. It remains unclear what exactly Congress intended to accomplish
by removing the § 2510(16) amendment provided by the CALEA. See Joffe v.
Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 80, 93 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
57. Lindsey A. Strachan, Re-mapping Privacy Law: How the Google Maps
Scandal Requires Tort Law Reform, RICH. J.L. & TECH., 1, 10 (Spring 2011),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i4/article14.pdf.
58. Gruenwald, supra note 7.
59. Id. A number of privacy advocate organizations, including the EPIC
and the Center for Digital Democracy, criticized the FTC’s decision to drop the
probe and even questioned the “influence Google has over the Obama
administration.” Id.
60. Such actions included appointing a new director of privacy
management, implementing privacy training for “key employees,”
incorporating a privacy review process, and pledging to delete the collected
payload data as soon as possible. Id.
61. Chow, supra note 37, at 73–74; Fleisher, supra note 42; see also
Wayne Rash, Google’s WiFi Opt-Out Process Makes Users Navigate Technical
Maze, EWEEK.COM (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-andWireless/Googles-WiFi-Optout-Process-Makes-Users-Navigate-TechnicalMaze-696453/ (discussing the difficulties most people would face with
implementing the opt-out policy, the failure of the policy to protect users’
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Congress to implement tougher consumer privacy rules—
particularly legislation that would regulate data brokers who
compile and sell a range of personal and financial data.62
On November 3, 2010, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) sent an initial letter of inquiry requesting
information on how Google collected the payload data, what
Google collected, and whether any data had been examined or
used.63 Google provided minimal information, and admitted to
not making a comprehensive review of the FCC request, stating
it would be “time consuming” and “burdensome.”64 Overall, the
investigation did not run smoothly. Google hindered and
delayed the FCC’s investigation by failing to respond to
requests for material information and through repeated
failures to provide an affidavit stating Google’s responses were
truthful and complete.65
In the end, the FCC found that not only did a Google
software engineer deliberately write the code used in the Street
View cars with the intention to collect payload data,66 but
evidence suggested that as early as 2007 or 2008, numerous
members of Google’s Street View team had access to the code.67
rights, and the benefits of implementing an opt-in policy as opposed to the
selected opt-out policy).
62. See Tanzina Vega & Edward Wyatt, U.S. Agency Seeks Tougher
Consumer Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/27/business/ftc-seeks-privacy-legislation.html?pagewanted=all
(presenting the FTC’s concerns about the high volume of data being collected
and how little control consumers have over that data, and the FTC’s position
that consumers should have access to information collected about them in
addition to having the ability to correct and update that information).
63. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4018–19.
64. Id. at 4020. Google did admit, however, that employees on the Street
View team had actually reviewed the payload data on two occasions. Id.
65. Id. at 4013 (finding that Google willfully and repeatedly violated FCC
orders throughout the investigation).
66. Id. at 4021. The engineer wrote the code with the intention to collect,
store, and analyze the payload data offline for use in location-based services
and potentially other Google initiatives. Id. at 4021–22. Ultimately, over 600
gigabytes of data (including 200 gigabytes of payload data, some of which was
personally identifiable) were collected and stored on servers at Google’s data
center. See Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 2013).
67. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4028. For example, the code design
document cited privacy considerations that were never discussed. Google Inc.,
FCC No. DA 12-592, File No. EB-10-IH-4055, at 11 (Apr. 13, 2012). In
addition, based on e-mails from 2006 collected by the FCC during the
investigation, the design engineer made the Street View team (including a
senior manager) aware that payload data would be collected. Id. at 14–15.
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Additionally, the FCC investigation exposed a lack of
supervision over the collected Wi-Fi data and a general
disregard of privacy considerations.68
The FCC investigation determined that Google’s code
utilized a packet sniffer to capture, separate, and store the
MAC address and SSID of individual WAPs.69 The sniffer
would then search for “encryption flags,” and either discard
data from encrypted networks or capture all wireless frame and
payload data from unencrypted networks.70 Ultimately,
Google’s source code discarded data sent over encrypted
networks, but not the data transmitted over open networks.71
D. CURRENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
When discussing online privacy protections it is important
to note that the primary statutory framework in the United
States, the ECPA, became law prior to the Internet era.72 As a
result, courts and scholars alike argue that the existing federal
framework is poorly suited to address modern forms of
communication.73 Without change, privacy protection of
Internet and electronic communications will likely remain
“confusing and uncertain.”74 New communications technology

Moreover, another Street View engineer allegedly conducted a “line-by-line”
review of the Wi-Fi project in 2007, and claimed he did not realize the code
would collect payload data. Id. at 17. Despite the fact that members of the
Street View team clearly should have been aware that they were collecting
payload data, those who worked on the Street View project “uniformly”
asserted they did not know about the data collection until April or May of
2010. Id. at 17.
68. See FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4027, 4033 (finding that the privacy
considerations listed in the design document were never reviewed by counsel,
nor by other Street View employees, and that a Street View senior manager
pre-approved the code before it was written).
69. Id. at 4016–17.
70. The packet sniffer would search for encryption flags; if the sniffer
determined the frame was encrypted, the data was cleared, and if the frame
were unencrypted the payload data would be written onto a memory disk. See
id. at 4016–17.
71. Id. at 4017.
72. E.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002).
73. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he existing statutory framework is ill-suited to
address modern forms of communication like . . . [a] secure website.”).
74. Id.; see Matthew Beirlein, Note, Policing the Wireless World: Access
Liability in the Open Wi-Fi Era, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1123, 1126 (2006) (arguing
that inconsistent legal responses to the treatment of open wireless networks
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undoubtedly leads to new privacy problems, yet privacy
protections failed to keep pace.75 The failure of protections to
keep pace with technological developments are especially
disconcerting, given the fact that privacy harms might be worse
now than ever before.76
Although the legislative history shows Congress passed the
ECPA in order to protect electronic communications from
interception, with a particular concern for e-mail
communications,77 courts cannot agree on how to protect online
privacy. For example, some courts have found that users enjoy
a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications,78
while others have placed considerable limitations on the
protection of such communication.79 Additionally, courts
will create confusion among users and may ultimately hamper technological
development).
75. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
483, 564 (2006) (explaining that privacy problems are much different today
than yesterday, in that online privacy threats generally do not involve
physical intrusion); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758–61
(2010) (explaining that new technology inherently means that certain modes
of communication will be used more than others, which increases the need to
recognize privacy rights in such forms of communication); United States v.
Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475
F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the extent to which the Fourth
Amendment protects electronic communications is unresolved); Patricia
Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 76–77 (2007) (discussing the
gap between young peoples’ expectations of privacy on the internet (selective
anonymity) and those of older generations (control-centered expectation that
resulted from living in an era where one had greater control over personal
information)); Strachan, supra note 57, at 6 (describing a general disconnect
between views of privacy then and now).
76. Reputational harms are more permanent and tangible than ever. See
Sanchez Abril, supra note 75, at 75 (citing the permanence, searchability,
replicability, and transformability of personal information data, and the
“multitude of often unintended audiences” with access to such data).
77. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, 8 (1986) (describing new technological
developments at the time and defining “electronic mail”).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010)
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails); United States v.
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation of the
Wiretap Act when an employee configured a supervisor’s e-mail to be sent to
himself); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the underlying content
of e-mails).
79. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
e-mail content no longer remains private once received, thus losing any
reasonable expectation of privacy a user might have had); see also Allyson W.
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disagree as to whether communication over Wi-Fi networks is
exempt from Wiretap Act protection.80 Courts also disagree
about the existence of privacy protections for users of online
social networks (OSNs).81
It is difficult to discern any particular trend in online
privacy case law, but the weight of authority seems to suggest
that whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet
communications exists depends on an individual’s utilization of
privacy-ensuring measures.82 Non-content data such as a WAP,
MAC address, IP address, and SSID, are not typically
considered to have an accompanying reasonable expectation of
privacy.83 The distinction between individual users’

Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in Offline Precedents, 14
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 631–32, 638 (2012) (discussing the limited
privacy protections granted to e-mail communications, and the majority view
that e-mail content no longer remains private once received on account of the
third-party doctrine).
80. Compare Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that Wi-Fi communications do not constitute an “electronic
communication . . . readily accessible to the general public”), and In re Google
Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1083 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (holding that Wi-Fi communications are not radio communications, and
thus not exempt under the ECPA’s G1 exception), with United States v.
Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994, at *5–6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d,
475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that unencrypted Wi-Fi networks are
readily accessible to the general public, and that a diminished expectation of
privacy exists for data transferred over unsecure networks), and In re
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893–94 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (holding that communication sent over an unencrypted Wi-Fi
network is considered readily accessible to the general public and excluded
from Wiretap Act protection).
81. Compare Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that privacy protections for posts on social networks
depend upon the use of privacy controls), with Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 652–57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that no expectation of
privacy exists on an OSN, regardless of one’s efforts to utilize privacy
controls).
82. Haynes, supra note 79, at 638; see, e.g., United States v. Ganoe, 538
F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a user’s expectation of privacy in
the information contained on one’s computer can be diminished by one’s
conduct and use of the computer); Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (stating
that society recognizes a lower expectation of privacy when using an
unsecured network). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012)
(concluding that the transmission of electronic signals remain subject to the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test).
83. See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (holding that no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in non-content and addressing information); Johnson v.

1168

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

expectations regarding the access and use of Wi-Fi networks
and their expectations that private data sent over such
networks will remain private creates an additional
complication.84 Generally, users lack awareness of the privacy
risks involved when communicating over Wi-Fi networks
(encrypted or unencrypted),85 and yet expect that such
communications will remain private.
E. OFFLINE PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
The right to privacy developed and found its roots in the
Fourth Amendment.86 Since then, two influential articles have
single-handedly shaped the development of privacy law.87
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis tend to be considered the
founders of privacy law.88 Warren and Brandeis described the
individual89 right to privacy as the “right to be let alone,”90
which built on similar rights in other legal areas.91 Following
the publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article, privacy tort
law experienced significant growth and experimentation.92
During this time period, judicial analysis of privacy actions
focused on whether the resulting harm fell under the principle
of the right to be let alone.93
Over eighty years after Warren and Brandeis, Professor
William Prosser wrote an article establishing the principles of

Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 WL 1794400, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June
23, 2009) (“[A]n IP address is not personally identifiable . . . .”).
84. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 104.
85. See id. at 105.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
87. See Strachan, supra note 57, at 9–10.
88. See id. at 9.
89. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960);
Strachan, supra note 57, at 9 (explaining that Warren and Brandeis wanted to
prevent the affairs of private individuals from being exposed to “undesirable
publicity”). Warren and Brandeis believed that the resulting harm from
privacy violations was primarily mental and emotional. See Neil M. Richards
& Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1887, 1916 (2010).
90. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193, 198 (1890) (arguing that each individual has the right
to determine to what extent his thoughts will be communicated to others).
91. See Strachan, supra note 57, at 9–10.
92. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922, 1924 (explaining that
privacy tort law experienced a period of dynamism pre-Prosser).
93. Id. at 1915.
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privacy law still in effect today.94 In his article, Prosser
delineated four privacy torts—each designed to protect a
different aspect of privacy.95 The four torts seek to protect
against (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of
private facts; (3) publicity that places an individual in false
light in the public eye; and (4) the appropriation of one’s name
or likeness.96 Prosser expressed concern that privacy law may
expand and invade upon other distinct legal fields, and as a
result, sought to steer it toward a limited and cautious path.97
Stemming from Prosser’s caution, scholars have begun to
question the effectiveness of current privacy tort law.98 Some
scholars argue that Prosser made privacy tort law static and
limited its ability to grow and adapt to privacy concerns
relevant in today’s society.99 As a result, scholars increasingly
believe that Prosser’s four torts provide little guidance on how
to shape future developments.100
The realm of privacy law is certainly more complex than
Prosser’s four torts.101 The lack of changes in privacy tort law
since Prosser, however, has left the tort system ill-equipped to
address modern privacy claims such as those raised in Joffe.102
It does not help matters that courts tend to be dismissive and
skeptical of electronic communication privacy harms.103
Moreover, the narrow and traditional judicial conception of
privacy as a binary, all or nothing approach is no longer

94. Strachan, supra note 57, at 10; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A-I (1977) (codifying Prosser’s four privacy torts). Nearly every state
recognizes at least one form of privacy tort by statute or common law.
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1917.
95. Prosser, supra note 89, at 389 (viewing the four torts as four distinct
invasions of four different interests, unrelated to one another with almost
nothing in common); Strachan, supra note 57, at 10. Prosser’s methodology
involved analyzing and restating the holdings of many privacy-related cases.
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1912.
96. Prosser, supra note 89, at 389.
97. See Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1887, 1906, 1915 (arguing
that Prosser refused to allow privacy to mean more than his four torts).
98. E.g., id. at 1889 (stating that most scholars believe privacy tort law
has largely been ineffective).
99. Id. at 1887, 1922.
100. Id. at 1890.
101. Solove, supra note 75, at 483.
102. E.g., Strachan, supra note 57, at 8.
103. See Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922 (reasoning that the
court’s skepticism stems from the usual lack of a physical component).
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sensible.104 Regardless of the limitations faced by privacy tort
law, and that private party conduct on its own fails to implicate
Fourth Amendment principles,105 this Comment argues that
offline privacy principles can and should be applied to online
privacy claims.106
II. JOFFE V. GOOGLE, INC.: CLASSIFYING PAYLOAD
DATA TRANSMITTED OVER UNENCRYPTED WI-FI
NETWORKS UNDER THE WIRETAP ACT
On November 8, 2010, Benjamin Joffe filed a class action
suit against Google alleging that the interception of payload
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks was in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1) of the Wiretap Act.107 The district court faced
a “novel question of statutory interpretation” as to the
applicability of the § 2510(16) definition of “readily accessible”
to the G1 exception (an express exemption to Wiretap Act
and
how
to
properly
define
“radio
protection),108
communication” under the Wiretap Act.109 Ultimately, the
district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss.110 Through an
examination of the statute’s text and legislative history, the

104. See id. at 1920 (arguing for the need to move away from the publicprivate dichotomy since information is rarely, if ever, completely one or the
other).
105. United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998).
106. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 122, 125 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351–54, 361 (1967) (establishing the test for what constitutes a
reasonable expectation of privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
465–66 (1928); Byars v. United States 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927); Ostergren v.
Cuccinellie, 615 F.3d 263, 290 (4th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n
v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Young, 153 F.3d at 1080; Sanders v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71–72 (Cal. 1999); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
107. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1072–74 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
108. “G1” refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012), stating that “[i]t shall
not be unlawful under this chapter . . . for any person . . . to intercept or access
an electronic communication made through an electronic communication
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public.”
109. In re Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1074, 1080 (noting that Congress
failed to define “radio communication” in the Act and also declined to explain
the applicability of § 2510(16) to the G1 exception).
110. Id. at 1084.
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district court held that § 2510(16) applies to G1,111 “radio
communication” does not include data transmitted over a Wi-Fi
network,112 and that Wi-Fi data sent over an unencrypted
network is not “readily accessible to the general public.”113
Following the district court’s judgment, Google sought and
received an interlocutory appeal.114 The Joffe court inherited
the task of resolving three primary issues of statutory
interpretation: (1) whether the § 2510(16) definition of “readily
accessible to the general public” applies to G1; (2) whether
payload data sent over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is
considered to be a radio communication; and (3) whether such
Wi-Fi communications are “readily accessible to the general
public” (under the ordinary meaning of the phrase).115 The Joffe
court became the first circuit to rule on the aforementioned
issues, which gave the court an opportunity to provide much
needed clarification as to the level of statutory privacy
protection afforded to modern, electronic communications.116 It
remains to be seen whether Joffe will be used as a catalyst to
provide a necessary update to privacy protections for modern
forms of communication, or plunge the already muddled and
outdated state of online privacy protection into further
disarray.
A. “RADIO COMMUNICATION” DOES NOT INCLUDE PAYLOAD
DATA SENT OVER WI-FI NETWORKS
Google once more urged the court to broadly define “radio
communication” as “any information transmitted using radio
waves.”117 Since the Wiretap Act does not define “radio

111. In addition, the court held that Congress did not intend the § 2510(16)
definition of “readily accessible” to apply to electronic communication not
classified as a “traditional radio service.” See id. at 1081 (excluding the
applicability of § 2510(16)’s definition to Wi-Fi communication).
112. The court defined radio communication as “traditional radio services
or broadcast radio.” Id. at 1083 (rejecting Google’s proposed technical
definition of “all communications transmitted over radio waves”).
113. Id. at 1083.
114. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2013).
115. Id. at 1267.
116. See Hanni Fakhoury, What the Google Street View Decision Means for
Researchers (and Cops), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/what-google-street-view-decision-meansresearchers-and-cops.
117. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1268.
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communication,” the court assigned the term its ordinary
meaning.118 After determining that Google’s proposed definition
does not conform to the common understanding of “radio
communication,”119 the court rejected Google’s definition.120 The
court reasoned that since Congress provided technical
definitions for similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but did not for
“radio communication,” Congress intended the phrase to be
given its ordinary meaning.121
As a result, the Joffe court defined “radio communication”
as a “predominantly auditory broadcast,” thus excluding
payload data sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks.122 The
court concluded that defining “radio communication” as a
“predominantly auditory broadcast” ensured consistency with
the rest of the Wiretap Act.123 The court reasoned that the
different usage of the terms “radio communication” and
“communication by radio” throughout the Wiretap Act,124 the
manner in which “radio communication” is used in G2 (an
express exemption to Wiretap Act protection),125 the avoidance

118. Id.
119. In common, everyday use, neither watching television nor sending an
e-mail over a Wi-Fi network is considered to be a radio communication. See id.
at 1268–69 (reasoning that under Google’s interpretation, a TV broadcast
would fall under the umbrella of “radio communication” and that one would
not consider TV to be a type of “radio communication”).
120. The court reasoned that the Wiretap Act does not assume that “radio
communication” includes technology outside of the scope of the phrase’s
ordinary definition. Id. at 1269. For example, the Wiretap Act’s damages
provision provides separate penalties for intercepting satellite video
communications and radio communications. See id. (pointing out that satellite
television
communications
are
described
separately
from
radio
communications, despite both transmitting over radio frequencies).
121. Id.
122. The payload data captured by Google included “emails, usernames,
passwords, images, and documents,” none of which can be classified as
“predominantly auditory.” Id. at 1270.
123. Id. at 1270.
124. The court reasoned that the phrase “communication by radio” is used
more expansively throughout the Wiretap Act, encompassing all
communication using radio waves. Id. Throughout the Wiretap Act, words
that evoke traditional radio technology surround the phrase “radio
communication,” lending support to the ruling that “radio communication”
refers narrowly to traditional broadcast radio technology. Id. at 1271.
125. “G2” refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) (2012), which states: “It shall
not be unlawful under this chapter . . . for any person . . . to intercept any
radio communication which is transmitted . . . by any station for the use of the
general public . . . .” While the G2 exception is not at issue in Joffe, the court
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of absurd results inconsistent with the Wiretap Act,126 and the
inapplicability of the Communication Act’s definition of “radio
communication”127 all support defining “radio communication”
as a “predominantly auditory broadcast.”
In arguing for a broad definition of “radio communication,”
Google heavily relied on two amendments that altered
§ 2510(16).128 In 1994, Congress adopted § 2510(16)(F), which
provided that with respect to a radio communication, electronic
communications are not “readily accessible to the general
public.”129 Two years later, however, Congress repealed
§ 2510(16)(F).130 Google argued that by repealing § 2510(16)(F),
Congress eliminated the only protection for unencrypted data
sent over a Wi-Fi network.131 The Joffe court rejected Google’s
interpretation, holding that nothing indicates what Congress
intended by repealing § 2510(16)(F), and instead elected to
follow the ordinary meaning of “radio communication.”132
reasoned that under Google’s definition it would not make sense to identify
certain types of “radio communication” (that have little in common with Wi-Fi
technology) to be exempt under G2 only to exempt broad, dissimilar
communications (such as payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network) in
G1. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1271. Rather, it makes more sense to read the general
G1 exemption in light of the specific exemptions in G2. Id. at 1272.
126. For example, if Google’s broad definition were appropriate, protection
for online communications under the Wiretap Act would turn on “whether the
recipient of those communications” secured his or her Wi-Fi network. Joffe,
729 F.3d at 1272. Given that the primary purpose of the Wiretap Act is to
effectively protect the privacy of communications, the court reasoned that
Congress clearly did not intend to permit “such an intrusive and unwarranted
invasion of privacy.” Id.
127. The Communication Act broadly defines the phrase “radio
communication.” Id. at 1274. Congress expressly stated, however, when it
wanted to apply a definition from the Communication Act to the Wiretap Act,
and did not do so with respect to “radio communication.” Id. Additionally,
unlike the Wiretap Act, the phrases “radio communication” and
“communication by radio” are used synonymously throughout the
Communication Act. Id.
128. Id. at 1274–75; see AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996); CALEA, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 203, 108 Stat. 4279, 4291 (1994)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2012)).
129. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1275.
130. Id.
131. Essentially, Google interpreted the amendments as standing for the
notion that both before 1994 and after 1996, payload data sent over Wi-Fi
networks are considered to be a “radio communication” which is “readily
accessible to the general public.” See id. at 1276.
132. Id. The court reasoned that the decision to add § 2510(16)(F) does not
show that Congress believed data sent over a Wi-Fi network to be a “radio
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B. THE § 2510(16) DEFINITION OF READILY ACCESSIBLE
APPLIES TO G1
For two primary reasons, the court in Joffe agreed with
Google and held that the definition of “readily accessible” in
§ 2510(16) applies to G1.133 First, the Wiretap Act treats “radio
communication” as a subset of “electronic communication.”134
Second, the Wiretap Act expressly provides that the definitions
established in § 2510 apply to the entire chapter.135 While the
Joffe court could not disregard the statutory directive to apply
§ 2510(16) to G1, the court did hold that the § 2510(16) “readily
accessible” definition only applies to G1 when the electronic
communication at issue is also a “radio communication.”136
Therefore, because the court determined that Wi-Fi data sent
over an unencrypted network is not considered a “radio
communication,” the § 2510(16) definition of “readily
accessible” does not apply here.137
C. WI-FI COMMUNICATIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO
THE GENERAL PUBLIC
After determining that payload data sent over an
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication”
under the Wiretap Act, thus rendering § 2510(16) inapplicable,
the Joffe court considered whether such transmissions are
“readily accessible” under the ordinary meaning of the
phrase.138 After a short analysis, the court held that because

communication.” Id. Additionally, no legislative history explains why Congress
decided to repeal § 2510(16)(F). Id. The court then provided two plausible
rationales, neither of which were consistent with Google’s interpretation, to
explain the decision to repeal § 2510(16)(F): (1) to eliminate redundancy; and
(2) to eliminate the incoherence created by § 2510(16)(F). Id. (reasoning that
§ 2510(16)(F) made it seem as though electronic communications are a subset
of radio communications, despite the fact that the Wiretap Act treats the
latter as a subset of the former).
133. Id. at 1267.
134. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (defining electronic communication
as “any transfer of data . . . transmitted in whole or in part by . . . radio”
(emphasis added)).
135. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1267; see 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (prefacing with the
phrase “[a]s used in this chapter”).
136. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1266.
137. Id. at 1268.
138. The court determined that although the transmissions at issue fall
outside of § 2510(16), such a transmission may still be considered “readily
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payload data sent over Wi-Fi networks are not “readily
accessible to the general public,” Google may not escape
liability through the use of G1.139
First, the court reasoned that unlike traditional radio
broadcasts, Wi-Fi transmissions are significantly limited
geographically.140 Wi-Fi broadcasts are limited to a peak output
of one watt, whereas other traditional radio broadcasts range
from 250 to 100,000 watts.141 Wi-Fi broadcasts often do not
travel far beyond one’s home or office, and tend to have a
service range of less than 330 feet.142 By contrast, an AM radio
broadcast boasts a service range of up to 100 miles.143
Second, the court found that payload data transmitted over
an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is difficult to intercept and
access.144 As opposed to traditional radio broadcasts, a wireless
device must be authenticated before it may communicate with
a WAP.145 Additionally, Wi-Fi communications are encoded
even if sent over an unencrypted network, and are sent only to
a specific destination.146 This method of communication makes
intercepting and decoding data extremely difficult without
sophisticated hardware and software.147 Most of the general
public lacks the technical expertise to intercept and decode
such data.148 As a result, the Joffe court affirmed the district
court’s decision.149
accessible to the general public” and exempt from liability under G1. Id. at
1277.
139. Id. But see United States v. Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994,
at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (“I conclude
that society recognizes a lower expectation of privacy in information broadcast
via an unsecured wireless network . . . .”).
140. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1277.
141. Id. at 1278.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. In order to intercept and decode payload data transmitted over a
Wi-Fi network, a wireless device (generally a packet sniffer) must connect
with the Wi-Fi network and proceed to send encapsulated and coded data to a
specified destination (in Google’s case, to the Street View cars and eventually
their data storage facility). Id.
148. Id. Even if members of the general public commonly connect to a
neighbor’s unsecured Wi-Fi network, such individuals usually do not
mistakenly intercept, store, and decode payload data. Id. at 1279.
149. Id. at 1278–79.
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III. GETTING DOWN TO BRASS TACKS: ANALYZING THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF JOFFE, THE RESULTING POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, AND A PROPOSAL TO EFFECTIVELY
PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF ONLINE COMMUNICATION
Considering that the issues presented to the Joffe court
were primarily matters of statutory interpretation,150 the court
did a good job of resolving the issues in front of them. The court
did fail, however, to take advantage of an opportunity to
provide clarification and guidance as to what types of electronic
communications are actually protected under the Wiretap Act.
Additionally, unlike what we have seen in a number of other
courts,151 the Joffe court did not make use of Fourth
Amendment privacy principles to address modern forms of
electronic communication.152 Perhaps the most glaring
shortcoming of the Joffe decision, however, was the court’s
scant analysis of what “readily accessible to the general public”
means in ordinary terms under the G1 exemption.
The Joffe decision failed to address a number of gaps in our
current privacy protection framework relating to modern
electronic communication technologies. As a result, the Wiretap
Act continues to provide uncertain and inadequate privacy
protection for modern electronic communications. On account of
the court’s failure to address the disconnect between Wi-Fi
users’ understanding of Wi-Fi technology and their
expectations of privacy when using such technology, the gap
between expectations and legal reality will likely continue to
worsen. Furthermore, due to the increasing use of cell phones
to collect location data153 and the ever-growing market for

150. See, e.g., id. at 1270 (“Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the
phrase ‘radio communication’ . . . . [T]he phrase ‘radio communication’ tends to
refer more narrowly to broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio
waves by which the communication is made.”).
151. See supra Part I.D.
152. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1275–77.
153. See Ellen Nakashima, Agencies Collected Data on Americans’
Cellphone Use in Thousands of Tower Dumps, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/agencies-collecteddata-on-americans-cellphone-use-in-thousands-of-tower-dumps/2013/12/08/
20549190-5e80-11e3-be07-006c776266ed_story.html (“Federal, state and local
law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations collected data on
cellphone activity thousands of times last year . . . . Data linked to specific cell
towers can be used to track people’s movements.”).
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location-based services,154 electronic communication privacy
protections (or, more appropriately, lack thereof) may very well
be headed down a slippery slope.155
Recognizing the fact that the Joffe court’s ability to
effectuate change was rather limited on account of the nature
of the case itself (exclusively resolving questions of statutory
interpretation), the holdings that Wi-Fi communications are
not considered to be a “radio communication” nor “readily
accessible to the general public” were a step in the right
direction.
Congress should use Joffe as a springboard to update the
Wiretap Act to expressly protect unencrypted Wi-Fi
transmissions in order to bring the reality of Wi-Fi users’
knowledge and reasonable expectations of privacy in line with
the law. By establishing a distinction between content and noncontent data, imposing new requirements on device
manufacturers, and applying offline Fourth Amendment
principles to the online world, Congress would be able to
provide effective privacy protections for modern electronic
communications. It is time to acknowledge and address the fact
that modern communication technologies have rapidly
outpaced statutory and judicial privacy protections.
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF JOFFE
1. What Joffe Got Right
An important element of the Joffe decision that went
relatively unnoticed was the court’s willingness to view online
privacy as something more than a binary, all or nothing
concept.156 Had the court adopted a binary approach, one likely
result may have been that encrypted Wi-Fi networks would be
considered protected under the Wiretap Act, while unencrypted
154. See SYNIVERSE, LOCATING AN OPPORTUNITY: THE RISE OF CELLULAR
NETWORKS AS A METHOD FOR LOCATION-BASED SERVICES 2 (2013), available
at
http://www.syniverse.com/files/Rise_of_Cellular_Networks_as_LBS.pdf
(“Although location-based services have been available for nearly ten years,
their usage has only started to grow significantly in the last few years.”).
155. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
156. Cf. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1891, 1922 (emphasizing the
necessity of rethinking outdated understandings of privacy by abandoning a
binary, all or nothing approach, and arguing that courts must change their
approach to privacy protections in order to effectuate this change in
understanding).
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Wi-Fi networks would be considered “readily accessible to the
general public.” This type of binary approach would have led to
the absurd results the Joffe court worked to avoid.157 The Joffe
court once more rejected the binary approach in holding that
the applicability of G1 does not turn on whether the Wi-Fi
network itself is accessible (unencrypted/encrypted distinction),
but instead on whether the communication itself is readily
accessible.158 Privacy advocates point out that the Joffe court’s
rejection of the binary approach provides a strong rationale
that law enforcement must now, at least in the Ninth Circuit,
obtain a wiretap order or warrant to access an individual’s WiFi communications.159
It is hard to argue against the court’s conclusion that the
§ 2510(16) “readily accessible” definition applies to G1 to the
extent that such communication involved is not only electronic,
but also radio.160 After all, the statute provides specific
instructions to apply the definitions found in § 2510 to the
chapter’s entirety.161
Furthermore, the Joffe court appropriately held that the
Wi-Fi communications at issue are not a type of “radio
communication” under the Wiretap Act.162 By using the
ordinary, non-technical definition of “radio communication,” the
court limited the reach of the § 2510(16) presumption that
radio communications are “readily accessible to the general
public.”163 After determining that “radio communications” are
“predominantly auditory broadcasts,” the court logically
concluded that § 2510(16) did not apply to G1 in this instance
since Wi-Fi transmissions are not considered to be “radio
communications.”164 While it is quite clear that Wi-Fi differs

157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
158. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1275–77 (9th Cir. 2013).
159. Fakhoury, supra note 116.
160. See Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1265–66 (rejecting Joffe’s interpretation that
§ 2510(16) applies exclusively to G2); see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees,
supra note 32, at 38 (arguing that since “readily accessible” is not defined with
respect to electronic communications, as it is with respect to radio
communications, the ordinary meaning should be used in G1).
161. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. See In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp.
2d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (describing the “presumption of accessibility”
established by Congress in § 2510(16)).
164. See supra Part II.B.

2014]

ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION

1179

from traditional radio broadcast services, the Joffe court failed
to espouse a general principle to guide the legislature and other
courts, who may now face the task of classifying a different
form of modern communication technology as radio or nonradio.
2. Inadequate Analysis of the G1 Exemption
In stark contrast to the court’s thorough analysis of
whether payload data transmitted over an unsecured Wi-Fi
network is properly classified as a “radio communication,” the
court glossed over what “readily accessible” means in ordinary
terms under G1. The court determined that on account of the
geographically limited range of Wi-Fi networks and the
apparent difficulty of intercepting and decoding Wi-Fi
transmissions, such transmissions are not “readily accessible to
the general public” under G1.165
By limiting the holding to Wi-Fi transmissions, the court
missed an opportunity to provide clarification and guidance as
to when certain communications are considered “readily
accessible” in ordinary terms, thus excluding their interception
from liability under G1. Arguably, the language used in G1
suggests that what matters is the intended purpose behind the
designs of certain communication technology, as opposed to
whether such technology might be able to be used contrary to
the designer’s intention.166 Simply put, whether something is
considered “readily accessible” under G1 should depend on
whether the technology itself is designed to make
communications readily available to the public, and not
whether an individual could engage in wiretapping “as a
matter of cost and practicality.”167 If the focus lies anywhere
else other than on the design of the communication technology
and its intended purpose, it is difficult to see how Wi-Fi
transmissions over an unencrypted network are not “readily

165. See supra Part II.C.
166. See Orin Kerr, District Court Rules That the Wiretap Act Does Not
Prohibit Intercepting Unencrypted Wireless Communications, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 6, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/09/06/
district-court-rules-that-the-wiretap-act-does-not-prohibit-interceptingunencrypted-wireless-communications/ (“The issue under 2511(2)(g)(i) is what
the designers intended users to be able to do, not what someone can do
contrary to the designer’s intentions.”).
167. See id.
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accessible to the general public” under the phrase’s ordinary
meaning. By adopting such an approach, the Joffe court may
have avoided significant criticism surrounding the holding that
Wi-Fi transmissions are not “readily accessible” under the
phrase’s ordinary meaning.168
3. Failure to Incorporate Fourth Amendment Privacy
Principles, Clarify Which Electronic Communications Are
Protected, and Provide Guidance Moving Forward
As previously mentioned, the Joffe court failed to consider
the applicability of Fourth Amendment privacy principles in
relation to modern communication technologies.169 Although it
would have been difficult for the court to utilize a Fourth
Amendment analysis given the nature of the case, numerous
other courts have begun to adopt such an analysis.170 Given the
high profile nature of Joffe and the growing disconnect between
old notions of privacy protection and modern technological
issues,171 applying Fourth Amendment privacy principles to
Wi-Fi communications may have gone a long way towards
updating and enhancing our current online privacy
protections.172
Throughout the Joffe opinion, the court seemingly tried to
jam Wi-Fi transmissions into a definition that would bring it
under the Wiretap Act’s protection. This approach represents
more of a patch, as opposed to a long-term solution, for
addressing the gaps in our current privacy protection
framework as applied to new communication technologies.
Such an approach simultaneously fails to provide guidance to
Congress or lower courts and creates uncertainty for security
168. See, e.g., Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, KISMET (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.blog.kismetwireless.net/2013/09/wi-fi-isnt-radio.html (“[T]he ruling
seems to think it’s difficult to monitor Wi-Fi . . . . I’m not too confident about
that assertion.”).
169. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., supra note 106.
171. Cf. Strachan, supra note 57, at 3 (arguing that “current tort law is
inadequate for such technologically advanced legal issues”); see also S. REP.
No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (“[T]he law must advance with the technology to
ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment.”).
172. See infra Part III.C.3; cf., e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note
32, at 21 (arguing that the primary concern in passing the ECPA centered on
individual privacy protection utilizing Fourth Amendment privacy protections
as a touchstone to keep protections of electronic communications in line with
the Fourth Amendment).
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researchers and similarly situated individuals.173 The primary
purpose of the Wiretap Act is to effectively protect the privacy
of communications generally, and not simply Wi-Fi
Cabining
the
opinion
to
Wi-Fi
communications.174
transmissions and analyzing the case solely as a problem of
statutory interpretation failed to resolve lingering uncertainty
as to what types of modern electronic communications are
protected by the Wiretap Act.
B. POTENTIAL POLICY RAMIFICATIONS
In addition to doing little to resolve the lingering
uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the Wiretap Act to
other forms of modern electronic communications, Joffe may
encourage various detrimental policy ramifications.
A sizeable and ever-growing market currently exists for
location-based services.175 The fact that the development of
geolocation technology has outpaced domestic statutory privacy
protections in the United States176 makes the billion-dollar
market for location-based services particularly troubling. Of
even more concern is that in the wake of Google’s Wi-Fi
debacle, companies such as Apple and Google have begun
crowdsourcing the collection of location data to millions of
smartphone users.177 Under Android default privacy settings,
173. One of the primary negative technological implications of the court’s
decision is that individuals seeking to capture unencrypted Wi-Fi packets for
legitimate research purposes may now face liability under the Wiretap Act.
Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, supra note 168.
174. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating the
objective of the ECPA was to protect against the interception of electronic
communications); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (amending the Wiretap Act to
protect against electronic communication interception in light of changes in
new computer technologies); see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note
32, at 33 (noting that all previous amendments to the Wiretap Act were
passed to keep pace with new technologies and to protect emerging forms of
communication).
175. See supra note 42.
176. Chow, supra note 37, at 62.
177. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36 (“Google and Apple are
gathering location information as part of their race to build massive databases
capable of pinpointing people’s locations via their cellphones.”); see also In re
Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L.
2011) (“These actions share factual questions arising out of the manner in
which Google’s Android operating system (Android OS) or apps downloaded to
devices running the Android OS collect, store and/or transfer user
information, including location information.”).
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smartphones report GPS locations and available Wi-Fi
networks (among other things) to Google’s collection systems.178
A similar process occurs on Apple’s iPhone.179 Companies then
use the geolocation data to create large databases of Wi-Fi
hotspots.180
In the past, most data about people’s behavior over
wireless networks have been collected from PCs and generally
could only be tied to a certain city or zip code.181 The increasing
popularity of Wi-Fi enabled smartphones, however, allows user
data to be collected with much greater precision to specific
locations.182 Moreover, a number of popular smartphone apps
use location and personal data more aggressively than Google
or Apple, occasionally sharing such data with third parties
without the user’s knowledge or consent.183 Such practices
demonstrate the enormous potential for abuse presented by
new forms of electronic communication technology in the
absence of updated statutory protections.184
Without the express statutory protection of Wi-Fi
communications sent over unencrypted networks, there exists a
real possibility that we may incidentally chill the use and
development of new Wi-Fi technology.185 It is logical to expect
that if one’s bank account statements, e-mails, and passwords
accessed over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network are held to be
“readily available to the general public,” that the use of such
technology will decline. This may be especially true in light of
the fact that reputational privacy harms created by online

178. Chow, supra note 37, at 71.
179. An unencrypted file on iPhones that recorded where the phone has
been—and when—was discovered, with the collected data stored by default.
Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Although the example is a bit extreme, a man was able to obtain the
social security number and work address of a female through a database
company, and then proceeded to go to the female’s workplace and kill her.
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1923.
185. See EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 33 (“Holding that unsecure Wi-Fi
communications are not protected from interception under the Wiretap Act
would place unreasonable burdens on Wi-Fi users.”).
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electronic communications may very well be more tangible and
permanent than ever.186
Along the same vein as other courts that have dealt with
online privacy protections, Joffe did not take into consideration
the importance of a typical Wi-Fi network user’s understanding
of how Wi-Fi works and their expectations of privacy when
communicating over a Wi-Fi network.187 A typical user who
accesses a neighbor’s unsecured network clearly knows that the
network itself is not secure, yet because of a limited
understanding of Wi-Fi technology and the accompanying
security risks, such a user still expects private communications
to remain secure.188
Although steps can be taken to secure Wi-Fi networks,
typical users often find it difficult to activate or enable such
features.189 The disconnect between the general public’s
understanding of Wi-Fi technology and the accompanying
security risks,190 the widely held expectation of privacy in
private communications transmitted over a Wi-Fi network, and
our outdated statutory privacy protections can best be resolved
by updating the Wiretap Act to expressly protect certain types
of modern electronic communications. Congress must start
taking into account the modern social contexts in which private
communications are shared online, and the reasonable
expectations the general public has about this shared
information.191
C. A PROPOSAL: HOW AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE
WIRETAP ACT TO EXPRESSLY PROTECT WI-FI TRANSMISSIONS
Instead of relying on piecemeal, judicially imposed
resolutions
to
effectively
protect
modern
electronic
communications, Congress should focus on amending the

186. Sanchez Abril, supra note 75, at 87.
187. See, e.g., Potnuru, supra note 12, at 105–07 (explaining the distinction
between a user’s expectations regarding Wi-Fi access and use, and the
expectation that data sent over Wi-Fi networks will remain private).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., id. at 105 (“Users . . . are typically unaware that data
transmitted over such unsecured Wi-Fi networks can still be intercepted
unless the data is somehow still encrypted.”).
191. Cf. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922 (providing suggestions
to reform tort law to address current privacy problems).
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Wiretap Act to expressly protect Wi-Fi communications and
similar electronic communications.192 Since the inception of the
Wiretap Act, last amended by the ECPA in 1986, the
technological landscape has clearly undergone significant
changes. Privacy problems today are much different than those
of yesterday, and the paramount goal of any amendment
should be to remove the current unpredictability and
uncertainty surrounding privacy protections of modern
electronic communications.193 Any amendment must be
carefully designed in order to account for inevitable future
technological developments in addition to increasingly
sophisticated packet sniffing technology. In the words of
Warren and Brandeis, “the elasticity of our law . . . which has
enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing
society . . . ha[s] been its greatest boast.”194
1. The Content/Non-Content Distinction
To provide comprehensive protection for modern forms of
electronic communication, including Wi-Fi transmissions, the
Wiretap Act should be amended to incorporate a content/noncontent distinction for liability. Essentially, any electronic
communications consisting merely of non-content data would
be considered “readily accessible” and thus exempt from
Wiretap Act protection, whereas the interception of content
data would give rise to Wiretap Act liability. For example,
when looking at an e-mail, the actual text and substance of the
e-mail itself would be considered content data and protected
under the Wiretap Act. On the other hand, an e-mail’s
addressing information would be considered non-content data
and therefore “readily accessible to the general public” under
G1. Such an approach not only maintains the old function of
offline privacy protections within a new technological
environment,195 but also conforms to the general public’s

192. After all, new technology gives rise to new privacy problems. Solove,
supra note 75, at 483.
193. See Solove, supra note 75, at 564; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 90,
at 193.
194. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 90, at 193.
195. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017–18 (2010) (replacing the
inside/outside distinction applicable to offline privacy protection with a
content/non-content distinction for online privacy protection).

2014]

ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION

1185

reasonable expectations of privacy.196 Encouragingly, recent
court decisions have pointed towards adopting a content/noncontent distinction.197
2. Imposing New Requirements on Device Manufacturers
Currently, factory default settings for the majority of WiFi equipment is set to operate in an open, unsecured
manner.198 Therefore, unless a user manually enables the
available security features, Wi-Fi networks continue to run as
an unencrypted network. As mentioned earlier, much of the
general public either lacks the technical knowledge to secure
their Wi-Fi network, or simply may be unaware of the privacy
risks involved with operating an unsecured network.199
Furthermore, security standards for Wi-Fi networks often
change, which places a heavy burden on even tech-savvy
consumers to keep up with the current standards.200
A relatively easy way to address the gap between the
general public’s understanding of Wi-Fi technology and
expectations that their Internet communications will remain
private would be to statutorily require manufacturers and
developers of Wi-Fi devices to provide secure default settings.
Statutory requirements would go a long way towards
protecting an individual’s privacy online, and would address a
root cause of the online privacy problem. Despite the absence of
such statutory regulations, Wi-Fi device manufacturers have
already begun to ship devices that provide secure default
settings.201
3. Applying Offline Fourth Amendment Principles to the
Online World
On top of imposing new statutory requirements for
electronic communication device manufacturers instituting a
content/non-content distinction, Congress and the judiciary

196. See supra Part III.B.
197. Kerr, supra note 195, at 1022.
198. E.g., Potnuru, supra note 12, at 94.
199. Id. at 94–95. The EPIC notes that out of the users who decide to
implement a password to protect their Wi-Fi networks, only fifty-nine percent
of such users implement passwords meeting basic criteria for strength and
privacy protection. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 26.
200. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 26.
201. Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, supra note 168.
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should be cognizant of the benefits offline Fourth Amendment
principles can bring to the online world. By applying Fourth
Amendment principles in a tech-neutral fashion through the
content/non-content distinction,202 the use of such principles to
provide online privacy protection becomes much easier.
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States established a
reasonable expectation of privacy, determining that privacy
protects people and not places.203 Later, the Court delineated a
two-part test in United States v. Jacobsen asking whether an
individual sought to preserve an area as private, and whether
the individual’s expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.204 The principles
established by the Court in Katz and Jacobsen are equally
applicable to the online world, focusing on a user’s reasonable
expectations of privacy in their electronic communications as
opposed to whether certain electronic communication devices
may be manipulated (such as through a packet sniffer) to
become readily accessible.205 Recently, the Court held in United
States v. Jones that the transmission of electronic signals
remain subject to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test.206 The holding in Jones certainly represents a step in the
right direction, and hopefully signals the willingness of the
Court to protect modern forms of electronic communication.
As this Comment has argued, the general public’s
reasonable expectations of privacy in Internet communications
should parallel our statutory privacy protections. Additionally,
one of the primary goals in passing the ECPA was to keep the

202. See Kerr, supra note 195, at 1007–08 (“[T]he contents of online
communications ordinarily should receive Fourth Amendment protection
but . . . non-content information should not be protected.”).
203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–54, 361 (1967).
204. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 122, 125 (1984).
205. For example, in Kyllo, the Court held that the use of thermal imaging
devices to detect heat sources emanating from a home constituted a Fourth
Amendment search requiring a warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
39 (2001). As opposed to focusing on the manipulation of a device (the use of
thermal imaging to see what normally would not be readily accessible to the
general public), the Court utilized the principles established in Katz and
Jacobsen to find a breach of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See id.
(“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘A firm line at the entrance
to the house’ . . . . That line, we think, must be not only firm, but also bright—
which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that
requires a warrant.”).
206. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
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protections of electronic communications in line with the
Fourth Amendment.207 Through the application of offline
Fourth Amendment privacy principles, our protection for
electronic communications will have the adaptability necessary
to combat evolving privacy threats just as offline privacy
protections have adapted to the development of post mail, cars,
and telephones throughout history.208
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that our society’s technological and
communications landscape has changed dramatically since the
enactment of the ECPA in 1986. Cell phones have replaced
landlines, e-mails have superseded snail mail, and pagers are
now ancient technology. While one would be hard pressed to
argue
that
technological
advancements have made
communication more difficult, the notion that new technologies
create new privacy problems cannot be overstated.
The court’s holding in Joffe with respect to Wi-Fi
transmissions sent over an unencrypted wireless network is a
step in the right direction. However, in order to bring statutory
privacy protections in line with current communication
technologies, much work remains to be done. Requiring
manufacturers and developers to create devices with secure
default settings, adapting offline Fourth Amendment privacy
principles to the modern online world, and a content/noncontent distinction would go a long way towards a needed
modernization of the Wiretap Act.

207. H.R. REP. No. 99–647, at 16–19, 31 (1986). A paramount concern of
the ECPA was to provide individual privacy protection using Fourth
Amendment privacy protections as a touchstone. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees,
supra note 32, at 21.
208. Cf. Kerr, supra note 195, at 1048 (arguing that this approach would
provide much needed flexibility for the protection of modern electronic
communications). If an unopened letter’s contents received by snail mail is
still considered private in the hands of a recipient, why do some consider an email in the hands of a recipient no longer private? Cf. Haynes, supra note 79,
at 625–26 (explaining that employer policy and email service agreements may
severely limit privacy protection).
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